Presidential Predicaments: Eisenhower III (of VIII)--Transfer to the Military
During President Truman’s administration, nuclear weapons had been for most of the time held entirely in the hands of the Atomic Energy Commission—civilian hands. Truman had declined to deliver them into military hands even during the Korean War, when he had been under pressure from General MacArthur to do so.
President Eisenhower, however, soon began to transfer our nuclear weapons into the custody of the military. In a big way. By the end of Ike’s administration, 90% of our now massive stockpile of nuclear weapons would be in the military’s custody.
Just the custody, not the control, right? To use the weapons, the military was still supposed to get the authorization of the president, as in Truman’s time.
But what about those new “tactical” weapons? They were being placed in the custody of our Army in the field in Europe, also in Korea. Some in the custody of our Navy on their ships. Could those weapons still be used only with the President’s say so? How was that supposed to work if Communist troops and tanks and ships were charging at you?
In 1955 the National Security Council modified President Eisenhower’s New Look policy that called for retaliation with “massive offensive striking power” is case of any Soviet agression. In NSC 5440, the NSC imagined conducting a “limited” nuclear war, as opposed to only a “general” nuclear war. A “limited” war would be one in which we would use tactical nuclear weapons and maybe not simply retaliate massively in the New Look way and thereby, as they said, incur “undue risk of nuclear devastation.”
But wait. Wasn’t threatening the Soviets with an “undue risk of nuclear devastation” the whole idea of “massive retaliation”? Did this change in policy mean that the National Security Council was recognizing that if we tried massively retaliating on the Soviets we might ourselves become subject to an “undue risk of nuclear devastation”?
This was something new.
Here’s some of what the new order said about what would happen in the “last analysis.”
In the last analysis, if confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.[18]
It’s not entirely clear to me what was being said here. It said we wouldn’t be “acquiescing in Communist aggression” but not what “acquiescing” amounted to. It did say that instead of “acquiescing,” we “must be prepared” to “take [the] risks of a “general war,” meaning, I think, a war that wasn’t just “tactical” but more like what “massive retaliation” was like. Which would risk us losing the support our allies? Or losing the countries of the allies themselves, maybe.
Did General Eisenhower or the members of the National Security Council know what nuclear weapons would do? Did anyone? Does anyone? Even the experts in “weapons effects”?
They had calculations of course.
Whatever. We clearly weren’t giving up entirely on massive offensive retaliation. But I guess the NSC and President Eisenhower had decided that we could deter the Soviets just as well with our tactical nuclear weapons and a threat of “limited war.”
When it came to invading Western Europe, that is. If the question was how we would respond to an attack by the Soviets on us here in the United States, massive retaliation and “general war” would be too good for them.
Not so good for us either, come to think of it.
Next: Presidential Predicaments-Eisenhower: Passing the Torch?