Are They Useless? XV-When Might It Be Okay to Use Them? I
The distinction between offensive and defensive uses has turned out to be important here. At least in theory.
Our use of atomic weapons in Japan, the only actual use so far, was obviously an offensive use.
Today, in the policies we know about, only “defensive” uses of nuclear weapons are taken to be justified.
President Eisenhower’s New Look Policy, formulated in 1953, not long after NATO was established, had declared that the United States would use “massive offensive retaliatory power” to respond to an attack of any size, even with conventional weapons, not just on the United States but on any of our NATO allies. Our allies were the countries of western Europe, pretty much.
In Israel and the Bomb (1998), the historian Avner Cohen said that in 1966 Israel developed an official policy on what might justify a use of the nuclear weapons Israel has never admitted to having. There were four “red lines,” Professor Cohen said (p. 209):
1. A successful military penetration into populated areas within Israel's post-1949 (pre-1967) borders.
2. The destruction of the Israeli Air Force.
3. The exposure of Israeli cities to massive and devastating air attacks or to possible chemical or biological attacks.
4. The use of nuclear weapons against Israeli territory.
We may want to notice that Israel’s use of nuclear weapons is here sometimes taken to be justified even if Israel hasn’t itself been attacked with nuclear weapons. But all these uses of nuclear weapons would seem to be defensive uses.
In June 2020, Reuters reported that Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, had signed a document entitled Basic Principles of the Russian Federation's State Policy in the Domain of Nuclear Deterrence, that said that nuclear weapons are seen by Russia "exclusively as a means of deterrence."
The policy then went on to allow the use of nuclear weapons
when Russia's enemies are using nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction like chemical and biological weapons [which Israel had also brought into the picture] on Russian territories or its allies [“Allies” are not mentioned in Israel’s policy and who Russia’s “allies” are is often a matter of some uncertainty];
if Russia receives reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking its territory or that of its allies;
if Russia's critical government or military sites are attacked by the enemy in a way that would undermine nuclear forces’ response actions; or
if the country faces an existential threat through the use of conventional weapons.
A use of nuclear weapons is here justified if Russia were attacked with any “weapon of mass destruction.” Nuclear weapons are such weapons, but so are chemical and biological weapons.
The word “existential” is here relied on to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the case of an attack on the country with conventional weapons. That attack must have put the existence of the country at risk. This would seem also be Israel’s policy though the word “existential” isn’t used.
No “existential” threat against the United States had been required in Eisenhower’s New Look policy. An attack of any size on us or our allies had been taken to justify the use of “massive offensive retaliatory power,” which would include nuclear weapons.
The Russian policy states at the top that nuclear weapons are seen “exclusively as a means of deterrence.” This is a statement of what is often referred to as the “sole purpose” doctrine, as in “The sole purpose of nuclear weapons is deterrence.” It is an almost automatic pronouncement when countries are called upon to justify their possession of nuclear weapons.
More recently the Obama and Biden administrations declared allegiance to the “sole purpose” doctrine.
But both the policies we’ve looked at here justify the use of nuclear weapons after deterrence has failed. Furthermore, does anyone doubt that any country that had been attacked by conventional forces and was in danger of losing the war would use any nuclear weapons it had, even in a “first use,” regardless of any “sole purpose” policy it might have adopted?
If a country decided to use nuclear weapons for “existential” reasons, the next question for them would be where and how to use them.
To attack the military forces who presumably were already inside their own country and cities? And thus attack one’s own cities and territory with nuclear weapons? Or to attack the home country of the invading forces? Would an attack on the home country of the invading forces be likely to save the defenders, especially if the home country of the invading forces also had nuclear weapons?
Would a “defensive” attack with nuclear weapons make it more or less likely that the defending country would continue to exist?
Would peace be what followed?
A lot would be unknown, wouldn’t it? Almost everything important.
On September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked on its home territory for the first time in anybody’s living memory. Terrorists flew hijacked passenger jets into major buildings, the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon. Along with the terrorists, thousands of Americans were killed, mostly civilians. Soon afterwards, U.S. President George W. Bush, declared what came to be called a Global War on Terror.
Was a retaliatory use of our nuclear weapons, defensive or offensive, considered? The problem here was that the attack on us had been conducted by “stateless” terrorists. What country, what cities, exactly, would we have attacked? If we had retaliated with nuclear weapons, might this retaliation have been seen as wildly disproportionate, just the kind of reaction the attackers were hoping for?
No suitable targets were available for our nuclear weapons.
Instead, President George W. Bush declared the “War on Terror” and Congress authorized him to spend money on it. President Bush had already sent military forces into Iraq and Syria. Earlier, during President George H. W. Bush’s and Bill Clinton’s administrations, we had conducted operations against militias in Somalia. That hadn’t worked out well. But now it looked like in the Global War on Terror we might begin to conduct military operations in countries across north Africa.
The terrorists who attacked us had been given a “safe haven” in Afghanistan, we knew that. A goal of the Global War on Terror was to keep terrorists—I guess so far they were all Islamic terrorists—from having a “safe haven” anywhere. President Bush and Dick Cheney now sent a large military force to Afghanistan. Kicked out the Taliban, an extremist Islamic group that had taken over Afghanistan after the Soviets left. Set up another government.
We sent troops of all kinds over there. Lots of supplies. Advisors. Helicopters. Lots of “private contractors.” “Private contractors” were people not in our military whom we paid to help us fight our wars.
Was what we were doing in Afghanistan and those other places an offensive or a defensive operation? We made it sound defensive, saying things like “we are fighting them there so we don’t have to fight them here.”
Congress hadn’t declared the Global War of Terror, just as it hadn’t declared any of the other “wars” we’d had since World War II.
How would we know when a war on “terror” had ended? Possibly to make it seem something that might conceivably have an end, President Obama tried to rename it as the “Overseas Contingency Operation.” The name hasn’t stuck.
Whatever it is, our nuclear weapons have been of no use to us in it.
Terrorists would find nukes useful. No doubt about that.
Next: Are They Useless? What would justify their use? II